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Abstract—Complex embedded systems often contain hard to
find vulnerabilities which, when exploited, have potential to cause
severe damage to the operating environment and the user. Given
that threats and vulnerabilities can exist within any layer of
the complex eco-system, OEMs face a major challenge to ensure
security throughout the device life-cycle To lower the potential
risk and damage that vulnerabilities may cause, OEMs typically
perform application threat analysis and security modelling. This
process typically provides a high level guideline to solving security
problems which can then be implemented during design and
development. However, this concept presents issues where new
threats or unknown vulnerability has been discovered.
To address this issue, we propose a policy-based security
modelling approach, which utilises a configurable policy engine
to apply new policies that counter serious threats. By utilising this
approach, the traditional security modelling approaches can be
enhanced and the consequences of a new threat greatly reduced.
We present a realistic use case of connected car, applying
several attack scenarios. By utilising STRIDE threat modelling
and DREAD risk assessment model, adequate policies are derived
to protect the car assets. This approach poses advantages over
the standard approach, allowing a policy update to counter a new
threat, which may have otherwise required a product redesign
to alleviate the issue under the traditional approach.
Index Terms—Secure by design, Security Modelling, Policy,
Embedded Security, STRIDE, Threat Modelling.
I. INTRODUCTION
The emergence of embedded devices within industrial and
consumer products hold great potential in terms of productiv-
ity, quality control, supply chain efficiency and overall busi-
ness operations. The embedded market has grown significantly,
with a massive range of products available to the consumer,
enterprise and industry. Estimates from ARM predict that
emerging connected embedded devices will proliferate to a
trillion devices by 2035 [1]. Most of these devices will have
inter-connectivity that exposes them to a myriad of security
risks and attacks, often derived from methods used to attack
conventional IT systems.
The majority of these security mechanisms rely on well
established software security practices. Reported attacks and
discovered vulnerabilities have shown that the device security
are often implemented poorly, or in some cases have not been
considered, leading to attacks such as the Mirai botnet [2], [3].
From an embedded architecture point-of-view, a major reason
for this is the need for varying levels of security, cannot
be defined generically due to being highly dependent on
the deployment scenario which could be based on consumer,
transport, medical and industrial control applications. As a
consequence, devices have been found vulnerable, with the
same flaws affecting different use cases, leading to attacks
affecting privacy, device integrity, and risking loss of sensitive
information [4], [5].
The widely practised approach for devising the security
architecture of a device is to conduct use case-based Appli-
cation threat modelling. This process assesses the use case,
deployment scenarios and device functionalities, identifying
the device assets that an adversary may target [6], [7]. This
process is defined in a way that complements the device
development life-cycle. The end-product of this process is a
security model, a technical document that provides security
guidelines specific to that use case. The designers then follow
these security guidelines, where possible, to achieve the de-
sired application security. The device is therefore created to be
resistant against only threats conisdered during the modelling
process. In practice, threat modelling can be compromised
by corporate practices, or invalidated by newly discovered
threats that were not considered during the development phase
threat modelling process. Changes to a device security and
threat profile requires updating the security and threat model
to ensure device security compliance. Technically, this may
require re-designing of hardware and software implementation,
which in many cases is neither cost effective nor technically
feasible [8].
Deployment of these powerful, yet generic embedded de-
vices in diverse and critical applications poses new challenges
for the semiconductor and hardware platform manufacturers,
who must provide security assurance [9] throughout the prod-
uct life-cycle, from product idea to decommission [8]. In-
ternational regulators have implemented further requirements
that quantify the security of devices and specify security
ratings [10]. These security and privacy laws will be enforced
across the landscape of embedded devices, meaning that
OEMs and device manufacturers must seek security assurance
from semiconductor/platform manufacturers for compliance.
To investigate these research challenges, we present a
policy-based security modelling and enforcement approach,
that can be incorporated into embedded architectures to ad-
dress some challenges faced by the emerging embedded ap-
plications. Section II will discuss existing security and threat
modelling practices. Section III will review relevant related-
work on security modelling, observing strengths and short-
comings. Section V will introduce our proposed policy-based
approach, followed by a connected car use case. Section VI
will discuss our findings and propose future work in the area.
II. BACKGROUND
The US government has performed extensive work into
implementing security policy for IT systems with particular
focus on Mandatory Access Control (MAC) and Discretionary
Access Control (DAC) [11], [12]. Later, the National Security
Agency (NSA) [13] extended it by developing the Security
Enhanced Linux (SELinux) platform [14] that can enforce
access control policies at kernel level. Similarly, ARM [7]
has published a security model specifications known as the
Platform Security Architecture (PSA), which aims to simplify
and enhance the security evaluation process by providing
guidelines and steps for creating a security model for con-
nected embedded devices.
Application threat modelling is a process of assessing the
security requirements of an application use case. The detailed
block diagram of design and development stages along with
the tasks necessary for Application Threat Modelling in Fig. 1.
The following are the key steps involved:
• Risk assessment: This step is to gain understanding of an
application use case, decomposing it to identify interac-
tions of different internal and external entities and their
associated risks. They are documented as the system’s
security requirements.
• Identify Assets: This identifies items of value that should
be protected. Dependent assets within the use case which
can also be examined from a data flow perspective.
• Entry Points: They are interfaces that exposes critical
assets to the attacker, and can be used to interact with
the system or application.
• Threat Identification: It involves identification of potential
vulnerabilities within the system that can be exploitable
by an attacker with or without knowing the architec-
ture and implementation details. These threats are then
categorised using categorisation methodologies such as
STRIDE, as used in this paper. This step is technically
documented as the system threat model.
• Threat Rating: The identified threat are prioritise and
quantified based on their likelihood, risk and potential
damage to the assets or the system infrastructure. The
evaluated security risk for each threat is quantified by as-
signing a value using risk-based models such as DREAD.
• Determine countermeasure: It involves defining a counter-
measure against each of the identified threats depending
on their prioritised risk ratings. Countermeasures can be
deployed in hardware and software. Smaller threats could
be catered using best security practises.
At this stage, a detailed technical guidance document is
available for both the hardware and software developers and
their implementation must comply to these requirements which
are then used for Secure application testing phase. These
guidelines direct developers when navigating security sensitive
areas of the device. However, issues are likely to occur where
the programmer has less control over certain aspects, such as
third-party IP blocks. Since the OEM has less influence over
the design process for these components, they are constrained
in terms of how they mitigate potential vulnerabilities.
However, in reality, threats may be overlooked or re-
main undiscovered during product development. As recognised
by [15], threat modelling is largely a theoretical analysis
task, dependent on human insights to identify threats. With
extensive use of third party IP, identifying threats within
largely unknown components is often not possible. Therefore,
when a new threat emerges, the existing security model may
be invalidated, due to the change in risk profile of the device,
undermining the existing security model.
III. RELATED-WORK
This section will survey relevant applications of threat
modelling to device and system environments.
Dorsemaine et al. [16] investigated potential attacks against
corporate infrastructures that leveraged compromised IoT de-
vices. They observed IoT from a layered perspective (objects,
transport, storage, interfaces), performing an example risk
analysis against the featuresets of a range of connected IoT
thermostats. This work did not perform a prescriptive threat
model approach such as STRIDE. In addition this work used
guidelines to recommend attack mitigations.
Khan et al. [17] demonstrated the application of STRIDE
to cyber physical systems to identify interdependencies and
security threats. STRIDE was found to effectively characterise
system threats while being lightweight. This work however
did not discuss countermeasures and mitigations. [18] further
used the STRIDE and DREAD models to mobile health
applications. Their work proposed mitigation strategies to
assist modifications to the development process.
Tan et al. presented a decentralised system-level security
approach, using resource isolation as the security foundation of
the embedded architecture [19]. Resource isolation is defined
in the form of access control policies classified into base,
owner and shared permissions. These access control policies
enable a hierarchical security profile for each embedded re-
source, with the device manufacturer, OEMs and users given
restricted control to manage it. They presented an in-depth ex-
ample scenario of home automation, covering security require-
ments and potential threats. However, their threat modelling
approach is not holistic, lacking quantification of threat anal-
ysis, based on well-established models such as STRIDE and
DREAD. Akatyev etal. presented work on investigating current
and future threats to near future inter-connected systems [20].
They described such systems as user-centric IoT, based on
offered services to the user and their direct impact through
physical environment. Contrary to Tan et al. they have adopted
a holistic approach, categorising identified attacks and related
threats using widely adopted STRIDE and DREAD models.
They facilitate quantification of the combined likelihood and
impact of each threat, giving improved visibility, to prioritise
design effort. They performed a detailed investigation of a real-
Fig. 1. Step-wise illustration of secure product development life-cycle covering both application threat modelling and secure application testing process. The
device security model is a task that serves as a bridge between these two processes that can be defined as access control policies.
world case study, however, implementation and incorporation
into existing design practises was not covered.
This paper aims to extend the policy driven approach
presented by Tan et al. [19], by presenting a policy-based
security modelling design flow incorporating its output into
the existing application threat modelling practises and design
flow. In addition, this proposed approach compliments the
work of Akatyev et al. [20] and Siddiqui et al. [21] by
performing detailed threat modelling of a realistic connected
car application scenario and proposing ways to enforce driven
security policies using hardware and software approaches.
IV. POLICY-BASED SECURITY MODELLING APPROACH
As discussed in Section II, the traditional approach at this
stage is to define technical guidance, which is then used within
the implementation. These guidelines direct developers when
navigating security sensitive areas of the device.
Our contribution to this area is to propose a policy-based
security model that can be tailored to the security needs
of the use case, providing a flexible security model that is
manageable and adaptable during the device life-cycle. The
enforcement of policies can be carried out by a software
component, such as SELinux, or by an external hardware
entity. In the event of an attempted re-purposing or exploit, a
hardware-based security mechanism can mitigate the intrusion
to protect the device. The policy enforcement engine com-
prises the following features:
• Hardware: Monitoring system-level communication be-
tween data and memory peripherals, enforcing the defined
security policies for each slave.
• Software: Checking application permission boundaries
and identifying anomalous behaviour.
By utilising policies to enforce these requirements, the
OEM does not have to rely on third party vendors’ security
assurances. Enforcing policies, derived from threat modelling
of the system, assets and attack scenarios, can ensure the
device operates as intended by the OEM. Development costs
may also be lowered for the hardware vendor if a generic
platform can be distributed to multiple users, who can derive
their own security policies based on the security requirements
and level of security desired using the familiar Application
Threat Modelling approach presented in Fig. 1 and enforce
them. Finally, should the security requirements of the device
change after production, for example, a new vulnerability is
discovered, the OEM can distribute a policy definition update.
V. CASE STUDY: A CONNECTED CAR SYSTEM
We have envisaged a connected car scenario for the purpose
of presenting a threat analysis and security modelling process,
considering both the standard, guideline-based approach and
our proposed policy-based approach.
A connected car features a variety of complex, intercon-
nected systems of differing levels of criticality, including
vehicle controls, sensors-based critical safety, infotainment,
telematics and cellular network access [22]. Various compo-
nents comprise part of multiple systems of differing criticality.
For example, cellular connectivity within the vehicle may be
used for entertainment or navigation purposes by the user,
for telemetry upload by the vehicle, to update firmware by
the manufacturer, or used to notify emergency services of an
accident or to deactivate to vehicle in case of reported theft.
Controller Area Network (CAN) bus is a de-facto bus
communication protocol used in cars and standardised as ISO
11898 [23]. CAN is a differential 2-wire, multi-drop and
multi-master serial bus protocol that allows communication
Fig. 2. Illustration of different system components of the connected car and
their connectivity using CAN bus communication standard.
between controllers, actuators and sensors. Fig. 2 illustrates
the connectivity of important car components (CAN nodes)
that are connected via CAN bus which will be used in this case
study. The internal architecture of a CAN node is shown in
Fig. 3 that consists of a CAN transceiver, CAN controller and a
micro-controller or digital signal processor (DSP). The CAN
transceiver receives 2-wire differential CAN-H and CAN-L
signals from CAN bus and converts them into single-ended
digital signals. The CAN controller parse the received CAN-
packet, to extract the control or status information of the
connected sensors and actuators on the bus. By design, CAN
is message-based broadcast communication protocol. Each
connected CAN node can receive messages from any other
node, which poses serious challenges to the security and safety
of the car [24].
To cover wider scope of this case study, we envisage that
the connected car features three operating modes, defined as
car modes in the Table I, under which the vehicle’s core
functionalities will be adjusted:
1) Normal mode: Standard vehicle functionality and normal
use cases, such as being driven or parked.
2) Remote Diagnostic mode: Reserved for maintenance by
manufacturer or authorised engineer.
Fig. 3. Block diagram of multiple CAN nodes connected via shared CAN bus.
Each CAN node has a dedicated CAN Transceiver, controller and a processor.
3) Fail-safe mode: Reserved for emergency situation.
For threat modelling, the car’s chosen critical assets
are Electronic vehicle (EV)-ECU, electronic power steering
(EPS), Engine, 3G, 4G and WiFi, infotainment system, door
locks and safety critical devices. For each mode, potential
threats have been identified and their corresponding entry
points are detailed in Table I. By employing threat analysis
methods such as STRIDE to understand how the threat affects
application and quantifying the damage of the realised threat
using DREAD, it is possible to estimate the severity and
likelihood the component will be targeted by an adversary.
To address the threat, a policy will then be formulated. For
the purposes of the example these will be read or write
permissions, but more complex policies such as behavioural
or situational based policies may be derived
A. Security and threat analysis of the EV-ECU asset
Three threats to the EV-ECU have been considered. In
this example we will consider the sending of spoofed CAN
bus data to cause disablement of the ECU during normal
operation. In effect, this would cause the vehicle’s propulsion
mechanisms to become unresponsive. The only way to disable
this mechanism under normal circumstances is when the car
is locked and alarmed, when a safety critical event occurs
such as an accident, or when a sensor detects an approaching
object that requires immediate reaction, such as approaching a
stationary object when parking. Spoofing or tampering of these
components may therefore maliciously cause such reations
during operation, resulting in a denial of service. This attack
would likely cause damage to the vehicle’s service ability, and
affecting its users. However, such a threat would likely require
specialist knowledge of the vehicle’s ECU, the mentioned
entry points and CAN bus. The reactive policy in this case
is to permit only to read from the ECU.
1) Guideline based security specification: Under a normal
security modelling approach, the described threat scenarios in
Table I can be addressed using a guideline based security
model. The countermeasures defined are guideline based.
Further to the identified infotainment threat scenario, the
following design guidelines could be used during development.
• Infotainment system: Provide frequent software updates
and patch system when vulnerabilities are discovered.
• Infotainment system: Employ software protections to
prevent unauthorised software installation
• CAN bus gateway: Limit components with CAN bus
access
Due to being a guideline based approach, the OEM would
have first have to redevelop the application or hardware with
the new requirements integrated before deployment. In the
worst case, a product recall may be necessary to install
the proposed updates. Alternatively the OEM may reduce
functionality through a software update, and integrate the fix
within the next product cycle.
2) Policy-based security model: Our model proposes that
new policies can be introduced, once a threat has been dis-
covered. These can be implemented through a policy update,
TABLE I
THREAT MODELLING OF A CONNECTED CAR APPLICATION USE CASE. DIFFERENT THREATS TO THE IDENTIFIED CRITICAL ASSETS ARE COVERED TO
DERIVE POLICY-BASED SECURITY MODEL OF THE APPLICATION.
Car Mode
Critical Normal Remote Fail- Entry Points Potential Threats STRIDE DREAD Policy
Assets Diagn. safe (Avg.)
• Door locks, safety critical Spoofed data over CANbus causing STD 8,5,4,6,4 (5.4) R
EV-ECU • Sensors disablement of ECU STD 8,5,4,6,4 (5.4) R
(accel, brake, • 3G/4G/WiFi Disabled remote tracking system after theft SD 6,3,3,6,4 (4.4) RW
transmission) • 3G/4G/WiFi Fail-safe protection override to reactivate vehicle STE 5,5,5,7,6 (5.6) R
EPS (Steering) • Any node EPS deactivation through compromised CAN node. STD 5,5,5,6,7 (5.6) R
Engine • Sensors Deactivation through compromised sensor STD 6,5,4,7,5 (5.4) R
• EV-ECU, Sensors Critical component modification during operation STIDE 7,5,5,9,4 (6.0) R
3G/4G/WiFi • Infotainment system Privacy attack using modified radio firmware TIE 7,5,5,6,5 (5.6) R
• Emergency, door locks Prevent operation of fail-safe comms by TDE 6,6,7,8,6 (6.6) RW
• Sensors, Air bags disabling modem. TDE 6,6,7,8,6 (6.6) R
Infotainment • Media player browser Exploit to gain access to higher control level STE 7,5,6,8,6 (6.4) R
System • Sensors, EV-ECU Modification of car status values, GPS, speed, etc STR 3,5,6,4,5 (4.6) R
Door locks • 3G/4G/WiFi, Manual
open
Unlock attempt while in motion TDE 8,5,3,8,5 (5.8) R
• 3G/4G/WiFi, Safety criti-
cal
Lock mechanism triggered during accident TDE 8,6,7,8,5 (6.8) W
Safety • Sensors False triggering of fail-safe mode to unlock vehicle STE 7,4,5,8,4 (5.6) R
Critical • Sensors Disable alarm and locking system to allow theft TE 9,4,5,9,4 (6.2) W
which would be significantly faster and easier to implement
than a software redesign or product recall. The following ex-
amples are policies that may protect the device, in the context
of the described infotainment scenario. Table I describes read
and write policies that can be enforced at the entry points.
More fine-grained policies may include the following;
• Infotainment system: Prevent software installation activ-
ities initiated from the media display
• Infotainment system: Enforce access of permitted com-
mands using software-based policy method, eg SELinux
• CAN nodes: Enforce CAN ID verification on hardware
policy engine at read/write filters within CAN controller
3) Advantages of the proposed approach: By utilising a
policy-based approach, the OEM is not limited to addressing
threats at the design phase. Upon detection of a new threat,
policies can be defined to thwart the attack at a hardware
or software level. These can then be distributed by a policy
update mechanism. The entire cycle of threat and security
modelling, along with implementation, testing and verification,
prior to deployment, has potential to be much shorter and more
effective than the standard guideline approach.
B. Policy enforcement approach
A vital component of our proposed policy-based security
modelling approach is the enforcement of the driven policies
within the device. This approach is inspired by the funda-
mental concepts of least privilege [25], which is enforced in
computer systems through methods such as access control
lists [26]. This section presents and discusses the possible
software and hardware techniques that can be used to deploy
policy-based approach:
1) SELinux-based policy enforcement: Policies are de-
ployed using a modular approach, allowing administrators to
tailor applications to their requirements [27]. Policies can be
updated to apply new Mandatory Access Controls [28].
2) Hardware-based policy engine (HPE) architecture:
Siddiqui et al. have presented a hardware-based policy engine
(HPE), a system architecture that checks the approved list of
devices and either grants or restrict access to the device [21].
Generally, the CAN node controller utilises a programmable
software based filter. However, these may be vulnerable to
software layer attacks, such as firmware modification. To this
end, we propose a hardware-based policy engine that monitors
the CAN messages and filters malicious and unexpected mes-
sages using their message IDs as shown in Fig. 4. The HPE
consists of a separate hardware-based reading filter and writing
filter, which facilitates curtailment of both inside (launched by
Fig. 4. Block diagram of CAN node with integrated hardware-based policy
engine. It enforces security policies by filtering CAN messages.
a compromised node) and outside (launched by a malicious
node introduced in the system to attack healthy nodes) attacks.
In addition, the HPE provides an additional layer of defence
over existing security mechanisms as it remain transparent to
the system software. The HPE consists of following hardware
components as shown in Fig. 4:
• Approved reading and writing list: It holds a list of
approved CAN messages IDs that provides necessary
information to the node to provide relevant services to
the rest of the system without comprising the security.
• Decision Block: The decision block references the ap-
proved list of message IDs, compares it against the
issued/received message and either grants or blocks the
access as shown in Fig. 4.
Once the sanity check is completed, the CAN message can
be either be used by the local CAN node (read) or send (write)
it to the CAN bus which can be utilised by other nodes.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This paper’s contribution has been to present existing ap-
proaches to device security modelling, presenting dificulties
where they are restricted to influencing the design and de-
velopment stage and not after deployment, when changes
are more difficult to implement. This paper has therefore
explored directly deriving and applying policies from the
security modelling. This is particularly useful where the the
vendor wishes to lower costs and provide a generic platform
for multiple use cases, and where a flaw has been found in
a device is already released in the market that could not be
rectified without redesign.
This paper has walked through a realistic use case that
shows how the application of policies can mitigate security
flaws, with the alternative solution being a complex upgrade
procedure that customers may be unwilling to perform.
Our proposed approach complements both existing work
into threat models along with security modelling applications
in software and hardware. The next phase of this research is to
study the low level implementation of the proposed approach
into a generic hardware platform and evaluate its effectiveness
for systems with differing criticality.
REFERENCES
[1] P. Spark, “White Paper: The route to a trillion devices: The outlook
for IoT investment to 2035,” ARM, Tech. Rep., 2017. [Online].
Available: https://community.arm.com/iot/b/blog/posts/white-paper-the-
route-to-a-trillion-devices
[2] M. Antonakakis et al., “Understanding the Mirai Botnet,” in 26th
USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 17). Vancouver, BC:
USENIX Association, 2017, pp. 1093–1110.
[3] E. Ronen, A. Shamir, A. O. Weingarten, and C. O’Flynn, “IoT Goes
Nuclear: Creating a ZigBee Chain Reaction,” in Proc. IEEE Symposium
on Security and Privacy (SP), May 2017, pp. 195–212.
[4] C. Valasek and C. Miller, “Remote Exploitation of
an Unaltered Passenger Vehicle,” 2015. [Online]. Available:
https://www.defcon.org/html/defcon-23/dc-23-speakers.html
[5] S. Samtani et al., “Identifying Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
(SCADA) Devices and their Vulnerabilities on the Internet of Things
(IoT): A Text Mining Approach,” IEEE Intelligent Systems, pp. 1–1,
2018.
[6] D. Lowry, E. Keary, and D. Rook, “Application Threat
Modeling,” OWASP, Tech. Rep., 2015. [Online]. Available:
https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Application Threat Modeling
[7] Arm Limited, “ARM Platform Security Architecture Overview,” ARM,
Tech. Rep., 2017. [Online]. Available: https://pages.arm.com/PSA-
Building-a-secure-IoT.html
[8] M. Wolf and D. Serpanos, “Safety and security in cyber-physical systems
and internet-of-things systems,” Proceedings of the IEEE, vol. 106, no. 1,
pp. 9–20, Jan. 2018.
[9] H. Khattri, N. K. V. Mangipudi, and S. Mandujano, “HSDL: A Security
Development Lifecycle for hardware technologies,” in Proc. IEEE Inter-
national Symposium on Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust (HOST),
Jun. 2012, pp. 116–121.
[10] Cabinet Office, National security and intelligence, HM Treasury, and
The Rt Hon Philip Hammond MP, “National Cyber Security Strategy
2016 to 2021,” HM Government, UK, Tech. Rep., 2016. [Online].
Available: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/national-cyber-
security-strategy-2016-to-2021
[11] National Computer Security Center, A Guide to Understanding Security
Modeling in Trusted Systems. DIANE Publishing Company, 1993.
[12] S. Chokhani, “Trusted products evaluation,” Commun. ACM, vol. 35,
no. 7, pp. 64–76, Jul. 1992.
[13] “Security enhanced linux,” National Security Agency —
Central Security Service, Tech. Rep., 2008. [Online]. Available:
https://www.nsa.gov/what-we-do/research/selinux/
[14] P. Loscocco and S. Smalley, “Integrating flexible support for secu-
rity policies into the linux operating system,” in Proceedings of the
FREENIX Track: 2001 USENIX Annual Technical Conference. Berke-
ley, CA, USA: USENIX Association, 2001, pp. 29–42.
[15] S. Ray, E. Peeters, M. M. Tehranipoor, and S. Bhunia, “System-on-chip
platform security assurance: Architecture and validation,” Proceedings
of the IEEE, vol. 106, no. 1, pp. 21–37, Jan 2018.
[16] B. Dorsemaine et al., “A new approach to investigate IoT threats based
on a four layer model,” in Proc. IEEE 13th International Conference
on New Technologies for Distributed Systems (NOTERE), Jul. 2016, pp.
1–6.
[17] R. Khan, K. McLaughlin, D. Laverty, and S. Sezer, “STRIDE-based
threat modeling for cyber-physical systems,” in Proc. IEEE Innovative
Smart Grid Technologies Conference Europe (ISGT-Europe), Sep. 2017,
pp. 1–6.
[18] M. Cagnazzo, M. Hertlein, T. Holz, and N. Pohlmann, “Threat modeling
for mobile health systems,” in Proc. IEEE Wireless Communications and
Networking Conference Workshops (WCNCW), Apr. 2018, pp. 314–319.
[19] B. Tan, M. Biglari-Abhari, and Z. Salcic, “Towards decentralized
system-level security for mpsoc-based embedded applications,” Journal
of Systems Architecture, vol. 80, pp. 41 – 55, 2017.
[20] N. Akatyev and J. I. James, “Evidence identification in iot networks
based on threat assessment,” Future Generation Computer Systems,
2017.
[21] F. Siddiqui, M. Hagan, and S. Sezer, “Embedded policing and policy
enforcement approach for future secure iot technologies,” in Living in
the Internet of Things: Cybersecurity of the IoT - 2018, March 2018,
pp. 1–10.
[22] E. Uhlemann, “Introducing Connected Vehicles [Connected Vehicles],”
IEEE Trans. Veh. Technol., vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 23–31, Mar. 2015.
[23] “Road vehicles – Controller area network (CAN) – Part 1: Data link
layer and physical signalling,” International Organization for Standard-
ization, Geneva, CH, Standard, Dec. 2015.
[24] S. Checkoway et al., “Comprehensive Experimental Analyses of Auto-
motive Attack Surfaces,” in 20th Proc. USENIX Conference on Security
(SEC), ser. SEC’11, Aug. 2011, pp. 6–6.
[25] J. H. Saltzer, “Protection and the control of information sharing in
multics,” ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review, vol. 17, no. 7, pp.
388 – 402, Jul. 1973.
[26] R. S. Sandhu and P. Samarati, “Access control: principle and practice,”
IEEE Commun. Mag., vol. 32, no. 9, pp. 40 – 48, Sep. 1994.
[27] M. Jahoda, B. Ancˇincova´, and T. Cˇapek, “SELinux User’s
and Administrator’s Guide,” RedHat, Tech. Rep., 2018.
[Online]. Available: https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-
us/red hat enterprise linux/7/html-single/selinux users and administra
tors guide/index
[28] K. Macmillan et al., “Design and Implementation of the SELinux
Policy Management Server,” in Proc. of the Security Enhanced Linux
Symposium, 01 2006, pp. 1–6.
